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Trends in Communist Propaganda

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TRENDS

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW DEFENDS SUMMIT ACCORDS, NOTES WESTERN CRITICISM

The unrelieved euphoria which characterized Moscow comment on the Vladivostok summit during the two weeks following the meeting has given way recently to a more balanced style of comment, in which some acknowledgment has been made of the mixed reactions in the West. Most of the Soviet central newspapers, as well as Moscow radio, have carried original Soviet comment over the past week, pegged in part to Western views on the summit. While they contain the same positive assessments of the summit expressed in official documents and leadership speeches, the self-congratulations are accompanied by assertions that are somewhat defensive in tone.

The commentaries that have addressed Western criticisms of the summit have included an article by Yuriy Yartsev in LITERARY GAZETTE on 4 December, an article by V. Osipov in IZVESTIYA on 5 December, an article in LIFE ABROAD reported by TASS on 7 December, and a Moscow radio commentary to North America by Pozner on 8 December. All of them reported various criticisms of the summit results by such Western figures as Senators Jackson and Buckley and journalists Zorza, Reston, and Kraft. Some commentators went beyond a mere disparagement of this criticism to offer a reasoned defense of the summit. V. Osipov, in IZVESTIYA, for example, noting criticism about the modest nature of the arms limitation accord, defended it as the "maximum possible under present conditions."

On the substantive aspects of the accords, the recent articles have continued the trend noted in earlier Soviet comment--foreshortening the time period provided for reaching a new agreement on strategic offensive weapons. An editorial in SOVIET RUSSIA on 2 December said that the Vladivostok agreement called for completing work on a new accord in the "near future." A dispatch in PRAVDA on 4 December compressed the time frame even further, speaking of completing the agreement in the "immediate future." Moscow continues to avoid referring to the numerical missile ceilings in the accord, but PRAVDA on 4 December quoted President Ford as having told his news conference that the "agreed maximum limits" were substantially below what would have been reached if the arms race had continued unabated.

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The aspects of the Vladivostok summit dealing with trade have come in for increased attention in some of the more recent commentary. An international review by C. Orestov on 8 December saw President Ford's remarks to the recent trade conference as an indication that the summit initiatives were being followed up. It volunteered the advice, as other Soviet commentaries have, that an expansion of trade would be particularly helpful for the United States at this time, in view of the worsening economic conditions in the world.

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CSCE-MBFR

MOSCOW, PARIS ENDORSE SUMMIT CSCE BUT NOTE OUTSTANDING ISSUES

Moscow comment on Brezhnev's 4-7 December "working visit" to France has predictably played up the portion of the final joint communique containing formal French endorsement of a summit-level CSCE finale, while all but ignoring the passage in which Paris stipulated that certain conditions must be met before France would attend such a summit. The wording on CSCE in the communique carefully balanced Soviet and French interests, Paris in effect saying yes to a summit, but only after its demands for satisfactory progress on outstanding issues are met. The Soviet leadership approval statement on the results of the visit, issued on the 9th by the CPSU Politburo, Supreme Soviet Presidium, and USSR Council of Ministers, singled out the passage on the summit and made no mention of the passage on outstanding questions, and, according to a Moscow radio summary, PRAVDA followed this lead in an editorial on the 11th.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE In the first paragraph on CSCE, the joint communique alluded to the recent movement in Geneva in formulating the document on reunification of families, noting that "considerable progress" had been made during the current second stage, "particularly in the last weeks." In a passage reflecting the French demands for progress in the CSCE "third basket" on expanding human and cultural relations between West and East Europe, the two sides declared "their determination to step up efforts in concerting questions which are not yet agreed upon within the framework of the agenda adopted in Helsinki, so as to conclude the second stage of the conference." With priority thus given to the resolution of outstanding questions, the communique then said that the two sides "state that good prerequisites have been created for the conclusion of the conference at the earliest date, for holding its third stage and signing its final documents at summit level."

SOVIET STATEMENTS Statements by Brezhnev and Soviet spokesman during the visit had underscored Soviet interest in obtaining French endorsement of a summit finale. Thus in his dinner speech on the 5th Brezhnev reiterated the Soviet call for the "speediest successful conclusion" of the conference "at the most authoritative level," while French President Giscard d'Estaing made no reference to CSCE in his speech. IZVESTIYA on the 6th, according to TASS, noted that "the Soviet side" in the Paris talks had pointed to the need for an early CSCE conclusion at summit level.

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Brezhnev's spokesman during the visit, TASS director general Leonid Zamyatin, in remarks unreported by Moscow media, told the press on the 6th that he thought the summit would be held in the first half of 1975. And in a Paris radio interview on the 6th--also unreported by Soviet media--PRAVDA's senior political observer Yuriy Zhukov in a response to a question on CSCE said optimistically that the talks "were going very well." Preempting the official announcement in the communique, Zhukov observed that France, the USSR, the United States, and "several" other countries "are now inclined to hold the last phase [of the conference] as soon as possible and to have it crowned by a summit." Moscow did not report a statement by Giscard's spokesman on the 7th that French backing for the summit was dependent on progress in the CSCE "third basket."

WARSAW HINTS FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS MAY BE RAISED AT MBFR

Moscow and other Warsaw Pact comment on the Vladivostok summit had ignored the fact that "forward-based systems" (FBS), i.e., U.S. nuclear armed forces in Europe, had been implicitly excluded from the SALT agreement. However, a single 10 December Warsaw PAP dispatch on the winter recess of the MBFR talks in Vienna broached the issue of FBS when it implied that it might be raised there when the talks resume next year.

PAP special correspondent Andrzej Rayzacher in his Vienna dispatch on the 10th incorrectly cited President Ford as having spoken "in favor of the possibility of expanding the agenda of the Vienna negotiations" by introducing the "reduction" of the U.S. forward-based systems in Europe. It is unclear whether Rayzacher was misled by an incorrect account of President Ford's 2 December press conference remarks or was aware of the mistake but consciously used the erroneous account as a device for raising the issue.

President Ford, when asked at his press conference about the possibility of including discussion of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in the MBFR talks, in fact said that U.S. forward-based systems were not to be included in the delivery-system and MIRV limitations as outlined in the Vladivostok statement. He went on to say that reduction of military personnel and arms reduction were being discussed in the MBFR talks. According to the Vienna DIE PRESSE on the 5th, the U.S. embassy in Vienna issued a USIS release attributing to the President the statement that "he hopes that the tactical nuclear arms of the United States stationed in Europe can be reduced in the course of the talks" on MBFR. DIE PRESSE noted that this release was later corrected.

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Rayzacher cited the incorrect Presidential statement after reviewing the standard Warsaw Pact criticism of NATO's negotiating position calling for "asymmetrical" reductions between NATO and the Pact and limiting any reduction to ground troops while excluding air force units and nuclear-armed weapons. Observing that "circles close" to the socialist states' delegations in Vienna "do not deny that the structures of the military potentials of both blocs are different, everybody knows," he added, that these potentials are balanced and provide stability in central Europe. In this context he noted the alleged Presidential statement, saying that "it must have been the awareness of the need for keeping up the balance and stability that made President Ford speak a couple of days ago."

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VIETNAM

AGREEMENT SIGNED ON SOVIET ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO DRV

Moscow's reluctance since the Paris peace agreement to acknowledge its military assistance to North Vietnam has been underlined in its propaganda on the latest USSR-DRV aid agreements which, according to Hanoi, provide for military as well as economic aid for 1975. Hanoi's initial report on its economic delegation, led by Politburo member and Vice Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh, specified that the group was in the Soviet Union to hold talks and sign agreements on Soviet "economic and military" aid. While Hanoi's accounts of the 8 December signing of the agreements did not refer to military aid, the military aspect of the agreements was noted again in a 10 December NHAN DAN editorial and DRV reports on Trinh's return to Hanoi on the 9th.

By contrast, Soviet media have claimed that the agreements are for "economic and technological assistance" to the DRV and have--as they did last year--specified details of the economic aid unmentioned by Hanoi. Thus, a TASS Russian-language report on the 8th stated that the Soviet Union would "help the DRV to set up and develop its national economy through the supply of equipment and materials" and would particularly assist with geological prospecting and the delivery of road-building machines, tractors, trucks, rolled ferrous and nonferrous metals, oil products, and chemical fertilizers.

Moscow's sensitivity on the question of military aid also seemed reflected in its omission of the names of the military participants in the 3-8 December negotiations; Hanoi duly noted the participation of DRV Lieutenant General Tran Sam and Soviet Colonel General Sidorovich and Lieutenant General Sakekich. However, Moscow has reported a planned visit to Hanoi by a high-level Soviet military official, Chief of Staff Gen. Viktor Kulikov. The 10 December TASS announcement indicated that he would pay "an official friendly visit" to the DRV in the second half of December, and it is possible the trip is related to North Vietnam's celebration of the 30th anniversary of its army on 22 December.

Hanoi comment on the 1974 USSR-DRV aid agreement signed on 14 August 1973 had followed the Soviet lead and refrained from mentioning military assistance;* but some North Vietnamese discontent on the

* The agreements on Soviet assistance to the DRV for 1974 are discussed in the TRENDS of 15 August 1973, pages 3-4.

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issue may have accounted for NHAN DAN's failure to print an editorial on the aid pact. The party paper had editorially welcomed aid agreements concluded with other countries in 1973, noting promises of military aid even from Moscow's East European allies. The only other agreement on both economic and military assistance announced this year was the DRV pact with China, signed in Peking on 26 October 1974. In recent months, DRV agreements for 1975 with East European states have focused on "economic, scientific, and technical cooperation" for 1975.

USSR-PRG AID PACT TASS announced on 10 December 1974 that an "agreement on economic aid to the PRG in 1975" had been signed in Moscow by PRG Minister Nguyen Van Hieu and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers I. Novikov, who had also signed the pact with the DRV. The agreement is similar to the Soviet-PRG economic aid program for 1974, signed in Moscow on 20 December 1973, and provides for Soviet delivery of industrial and agricultural equipment, oil products, metals, medicines, and foodstuffs.

DRV GENERAL IMPLIES MILITARY SOLUTION BEST CHOICE IN SOUTH

An article by Colonel General Song Hao, chief of the North Vietnamese army (VPA) Political General Department, sets forth an argument which could be used to justify military action to achieve communist objectives in South Vietnam. Only a portion of the first two parts of the three-part article have been broadcast so far, and they have been couched in an historical and theoretical framework. However, a clear position has emerged in these opening installments: Song Hao cites evidence from the army's experience to demonstrate that Vietnam is able to fight while building the country, that it is against the army's tradition to retreat or stop short of success, that offensives are necessary to achieve victory, and that the army has always been ready to fight in any part of Vietnam.

Hanoi began broadcasting the article in daily installments on 8 December and was continuing to carry it as late as the 11th. According to the radio, the article was published in the December issues of the army's monthly journal TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and the party journal HOC TAP to mark the 30th anniversary of the founding of the VPA. Hanoi similarly marked the 25th anniversary of the army in 1969 with important articles by its military leaders, including Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung, and Song Hao. Song Hao's last major pronouncement was a speech on the army's emulation campaign published in the April 1974 TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. His last previous article in that journal was in February 1972.

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HANOI CONDEMNS U.S. POSITION ON AID TO DRV, COMMUNIST ATTACKS

DRV Foreign Ministry spokesmen's statements have attacked recent remarks by Secretary Kissinger on the question of U.S. aid to North Vietnam and observations by White House press secretary Ron Nessen on communist military operations in South Vietnam. A 5 December spokesman's statement, responding to Kissinger's remarks during testimony before the Senate Finance Committee two days earlier, assailed the Secretary for his remarks indicating that the United States did not plan to provide aid to North Vietnam in the immediate future. Accusing the United States of systematically violating the Paris agreement, the statement reiterated standard demands that Washington "fulfill its duty of healing the wounds of war in the DRV as provided for by Article 21 of the Paris agreement," stop all "encroachments" upon DRV airspace and waters, and end U.S. involvement and interference in South Vietnam.

The issue of aid to North Vietnam is not often raised in Hanoi media, but the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry has been careful to respond, as in this instance, to statements by Secretary Kissinger on this and other important aspects of U.S. policy on Vietnam. Thus, for example, a 9 June 1974 Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement assailed the Secretary's attitude toward aid to the North as reflected in his remarks to Congress and the press.* More recently, the alleged U.S. failure to meet its "obligation" to North Vietnam was included in a list of charges against the United States in an 11 October DRV Government statement demanding Thieu's ouster. The issue was also touched upon in the 2 December joint communique on a visit with the French Communist Party by a DRV party delegation led by Politburo member Le Duc Tho, Hanoi's leading negotiator of the Paris accord.

ALLEGED U.S., DRV
INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH

A 10 December spokesman's statement rejected as "brazen slanders" remarks the previous day by White House press secretary Ron Nessen calling upon North Vietnam to refrain from broadening military attacks in South Vietnam. Hanoi had not given so much weight to a 6 December statement by a State Department spokesman on communist plans for increased hostilities in the South; it issued no foreign ministry response, but it did publicize a protest from the spokesman of the PRG delegation to the La Celle Saint Cloud consultative conference.

* Hanoi comment on Secretary Kissinger's remarks last June is discussed in the TRENDS of 12 June 1974, pages 16-18.

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Nessen's remarks were also criticized in a PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 11th which went on to complain about other alleged evidence of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam--a recent visit to Saigon by U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Mendolia and Vice Admiral Weschler, and the presence of the U.S. aircraft carrier Enterprise off the Vietnamese coast near Danang. A 10 December QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary cited the military visits to Saigon and Senate passage of the military aid bill in charging that "Ford is evidently preparing for very dangerous new military adventures against our people in the South."

PRG MEDIA CALL FOR MEASURES TO INSURE ADEQUATE RICE HARVEST

Vietnamese communist comment has reflected considerable concern about insuring an adequate rice harvest in PRG-controlled areas of South Vietnam and opposing alleged GVN efforts to acquire rice in disputed areas. Action to deal with these problems was advocated in a 25 November PLAF Command order, broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 27th, which called upon communist military forces to help in the harvest, to frustrate GVN attempts to gain control of rice, and to "punish" merchants who cooperated with Saigon. This is the first such public order from the central PLAF Command since the 15 October 1973 order, which called for "counterattacks" against GVN military operations and coincided with a sharp increase in communist military action. The current order warns that Saigon will be "appropriately punished"; the 1973 order had threatened that the communists would counter Saigon forces at "any place and with appropriate forms and forces."

Warnings against GVN attempts to control the rice crop or destroy communist rice appeared in Liberation Radio broadcasts at least as early as mid-October--a 14 October broadcast charged government troops with operations to "steal" rice during the previous month. A 7 November broadcast, urging the proper harvesting and protection of the 10th-month rice crop, cautioned that "famine" must be prevented in the "liberated areas" and claimed, as have other commentaries, that many areas under GVN control had been "seriously affected by starvation." More recently, a 2 December radio commentary warned that there would be a "considerable decline" in this year's 10th-month rice production because of adverse weather conditions and observed that "the grain problem has become a very important problem in our present struggle against the enemy."

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The commentary advocated that families, military units, and agencies cultivate short-term potato varieties to help meet their needs for grain, and that an effort be made to obtain more grain from the winter-spring crop to "make up for losses" sustained in the 10th month season.

Communist media acknowledged recent increased military action on 10 December in reporting that on the previous day the PRG delegation to the two-party Joint Military Commission had sent a protest note to the ICCS. According to VNA, the note condemned GVN bombing in "liberated areas" of Tay Ninh and Binh Phuoc provinces and charged that the bombing raids, along with operations to seize PRG territory and rice, demonstrated Saigon "sabotage" of the Paris accord.

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CHINA

PURGED PLA LEADERS RETURN TO POWER, NEW SHANTUNG CHIEF NAMED

The rehabilitation of two PLA military leaders purged during the cultural revolution, indicated by NCNA reports on their attendance at Peking functions on 7 and 9 December, seems intended to sharpen the image of a united Chinese leadership at a time when Peking is strongly pressing party leadership and discipline, and to signal that other leaders may also reemerge. The latest rehabilitations may also serve as counterweights, preventing the accumulation of excessive military power by any one faction.

Former PLA acting Chief of Staff Yang Cheng-wu's return to power was signaled by NCNA on 7 December, when it placed Yang at the head of a list of PLA leaders attending the funeral of a CCP Central Committee member. Yang's new placement, directly above two deputy chiefs of staff, suggests his return to the general staff department, possibly as chief of staff.

Yang was acting chief of staff from the beginning of the cultural revolution until his purge in March 1968. He reappeared publicly for Army Day on 1 August this year, but at that time and again on 1 October National Day he was merely listed as "present," with no indication that he had been given a new post. The chief of staff position has been vacant since the dismissal of Huang Yung-sheng in 1971, following Lin Piao's death.

On 9 December NCNA revealed that another military leader purged during the cultural revolution had been named to the general staff. Reporting a party hosted by the Peruvian Ambassador in Peking, NCNA identified Wang Shang-jung, former general staff operations director, as a deputy chief of staff. Like Yang, Wang had reappeared on Army Day and National Day listed only as "present." Wang was purged in 1966 after Yang became acting chief of staff. In his March 1968 speech announcing Yang's dismissal, Lin Piao warned that though Wang had opposed Yang, he should also be criticized. Lin named Wang as a member of Ho Lung's clique, and Wang's full rehabilitation is another sign of the posthumous rehabilitation of Ho.

REGIONAL
COMMANDERS

From what is known of Yang's purge in the cultural revolution, his return to power is a further blow to the autonomy of military region commanders.

Speeches by some central leaders following Yang's downfall indicated that he had offended the powerful regional chiefs by making promotions from within his own small clique. He was also accused of opposing Chiang Ching and, to a lesser extent, Chou En-lai.

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The military region commanders were greatly weakened a year ago, when all who held joint provincial party leadership posts were transferred to new regions. None of the commanders has regained provincial party power in his new post, and in the two cases where provincial first secretary posts have been filled, the job has gone to civilian leaders. Most recently, a 6 December Tsinan report on youth going to the countryside designated Pai Ju-ping as Shantung first secretary and revolutionary committee chief. Pai, pre-cultural revolution governor of Shantung, had been second secretary, and in that post had regularly appeared in rankings ahead of Tseng Szu-yu, commander of the Tsinan Military Region. Kwangtung is the only other province that has named a provincial party chief to replace an outgoing military region commander. Last April Chao Tzu-yang, pre-cultural revolution first secretary, regained the post instead of Hsu Shih-yu, Politburo member and head of the Canton Military Region.

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U S S R

SOVIET JOURNALIST CHALLENGES POLICY OF EXPANDING GRAIN SOWING

A prominent Soviet journalist specializing in Siberian agriculture has warned that the current agricultural policy of massive expansion of grain sowing is causing violations of correct farming techniques in Siberia and could lead to sharp reductions in future crop yields. The article by Leonid Ivanov in the November issue of the literary journal OUR CONTEMPORARY introduced the charge that the current campaign to expand grain sowing is leading to repetition of Khrushchev-era mistakes. The present regime, reacting to the disastrous erosion and crop failure resulting from Khrushchev's reckless exploitation of the virgin lands, has been following a more conservative policy, observing correct crop rotation methods and leaving a part of the land fallow each year to prevent soil exhaustion. Ivanov's exposure of deviations from this policy may herald a renewal of the debates over Siberian agrotechniques which were characteristic of the Khrushchev years.

Ivanov was a sharp critic of agricultural policy under Khrushchev, defending the practice of resting land by leaving it in clean fallow, even when Khrushchev denounced clean fallow as wasteful and ordered it eliminated in the early 1960's. In 1963 Ivanov had exposed the errors of Khrushchev's scientific experts, who supposedly had proved that clean fallow was unnecessary, but his exposures were suppressed until Khrushchev's fall. Ivanov and other defenders of clean fallow were vindicated by the 1963 virgin land crop disaster, and following Khrushchev's 1964 ouster, a system based on clean fallow was endorsed by the leadership.

Khrushchev's successors transferred large areas of farm land to clean fallow and grasses, reducing the area sown to crops, and they have repeatedly stressed that grain output must be increased by raising yield on the present acreage, rather than by expanding the sown area at the expense of fallow and grasses. Nevertheless, Ivanov's article indicates that this policy is not now being applied consistently and that substantial deviations are being tolerated--a situation due presumably to the 1972 harvest shortfalls, as well as to the fact, noted by Ivanov, that crop yields in Siberia have recently stopped rising.

REDUCTION OF
CLEAN FALLOW

Ivanov begins by describing the recent change in attitude that has taken place among agricultural officials on the issue of clean fallow. He noted that there has been exceptionally good weather the last four years in West Siberia and North Kazakhstan, where even two good years

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in a row are rare. This, according to Ivanov, has "engendered in some leaders a complacent attitude," and "some people are already inclined to assert that now there is no reason to be especially concerned about the crops." As a result, "in a number of places they already have begun to neglect correct crop rotations, especially clean fallow." In a good year, he complained, farm leaders have been planting more acreage than planned, lured by prospects of a record crop, while in bad years they also have been sowing more land, striving to make up for an expected poor yield by planting a larger area. Ivanov wrote that "every time I hear on the radio or read in the papers that such and such a rayon or such and such an oblast has overfulfilled its spring sowing plan, I become depressed," because this means clean fallow is being reduced, land set aside to rest is being exhausted, fields will become weedy, and future crops will suffer.

Ivanov declared that he felt the need to speak out in defense of clean fallow because in the spring of 1973 many areas, especially in North Kazakhstan, sharply cut the fallow area in order to over-fulfill sowing plans. He pointed out that this tactic was actually counterproductive since "despite expectations," all oblasts of this zone produced less grain in 1973 than in 1972. The same mistake was repeated by many oblasts in 1974, he said, and he observed ruefully that "one gets the impression that some comrades do not wish to notice the high harvests produced by clean fallow." He warned that these areas would be especially vulnerable in the event of a future drought.

Ivanov argued that technological progress--especially increased production of fertilizer and herbicides--has not altered the need for fallow. He complained of the widespread opinion that clean fallow is obsolete, based on the ideas that the nutrients in the soil can be replenished by fertilizers instead of by resting the land and that weeds can be destroyed by herbicides rather than by fallowing. He pointed out that Siberia is still starved for fertilizer, that fertilizer does not help if there is drought, that herbicides damage new protective forest belts and reduce soil nutrients, and that fallow is indispensable in accumulating moisture in this frequently drought-ridden area.

EXPANSION OF GRAIN SOWING

Although Ivanov's article is the first to reveal the reduction of fallow in the virgin lands, other articles have noted the pressures for expanded grain production which are apparently encouraging this practice. A number of them have provided statistical indications of the scale of the policy shift that has been taking place since 1972. They provide an illustrative background to Ivanov's article and a general confirmation of the substantiality of his complaints.

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Under Khrushchev, the sown area had been vastly expanded to boost grain production, while clean fallow and grasses were drastically cut; but this trend was sharply reversed in 1965. The scale of the post-Khrushchev reversal was documented by A. Stepanov in the September 1972 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE. He calculated a 6,360,000-hectare reduction in the grain area between 1965 and 1970 and noted that grain sowings dropped from 122,700,000 hectares in 1969 to 119,300,000 in 1970 and 117,900,000 in 1971. Meanwhile, he wrote, clean fallow area had tripled since 1963, growing by 11,400,000 hectares to reach 17,800,000 by 1970. He predicted that fallow should reach 23-24 million hectares by 1975.

However, the reduction of grain sowings came under attack in 1972, and a campaign began to expand the grain area. I. N. Kuznetsov, deputy head of the Central Committee's agriculture section, wrote in an April 1972 PARTY LIFE that in 1972 the RSFSR was expanding its grain area by 1.5 million hectares and that Kazakhstan was also expanding by one million hectares above the plan. After the 1972 harvest shortfall the campaign accelerated, with articles and meetings urging reductions of fallow and grasses to provide new crop land. However, these calls referred to European Russia; no one mentioned such cutbacks in the virgin lands, and in fact PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA in early 1972 had specifically warned that expansion of grain must not result in reducing clean fallow and disrupting crop rotations in Siberia and Kazakhstan.

During 1973, according to an unsigned August 1973 KOMMUNIST article, grain sowing was expanded by 7.8 million hectares. The RSFSR added 4.3 million hectares, according to RSFSR First Deputy Premier N. F. Vasilyev in the 6 April 1973 SOVIET RUSSIA; the Ukraine added 1.8 million, according to Ukrainian Agriculture Minister P. L. Pogrebnyak in the June 1973 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE; and Kazakhstan added 1.5 million, according to Kazakh First Deputy Premier I. G. Slazhnev in the 29 October 1973 SOVIET RUSSIA. Benefiting from the increased acreage, RSFSR and Kazakh leaders were able to boast of huge grain harvests in the fall of 1973.

It was still asserted, however, that this would not reduce clean fallow in the virgin lands. IZVESTIYA on 18 January 1974 editorially praised the grain expansion and added that "no one is raising the question of cutting, say, the fallow area or violating crop rotations." It declared that the expansion would use idle and abandoned land and it cited the example of the Ukraine, which had substantially expanded the grain area even though it supposedly had no unused land. In addition, in the 12 March 1974 IZVESTIYA, A. Navolotskiy, deputy chief of the Ministry of Agriculture's main administration for grain crops, warned that in expanding grain output, clean fallow must be preserved in arid regions and if necessary even increased.

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Ivanov's article indicates that local authorities, if not higher officials, are quietly ignoring these admonitions in their urgent efforts to increase current grain output.

BREZHNEV MINI-CULT GETS BOOST AT ANNIVERSARY CEREMONIES

Although praise of Brezhnev has become a standard feature of ceremonial protocol at Soviet public functions, the display of sycophancy presented at some of the recent republic 50th anniversary ceremonies tops all precedents. In some respects, it recalls the practices of the Stalin era, with local press accounts reporting that the ceremonies were repeatedly interrupted by shouts of "glory" to the Politburo "headed" by Brezhnev, and "long live" the Politburo "headed" by Brezhnev. Speakers were reported as characterizing Brezhnev not only as head of the Politburo but as "leader" of the party and state. Moreover, in a form of praise that implied more about Brezhnev than about the supposed objects of praise, various leaders were introduced as "very close comrades-in-arms" of Brezhnev--a formula seldom if ever used since Stalin's lieutenants vied for this title. None of these extravagances were reported in the central press.

In contrast to the earlier series of republic 50th anniversary ceremonies (the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaydzhn, Armenia and Georgia, from 1967 to 1971) at which Brezhnev was the star speaker, the present series enlisted the services of four other top leaders besides Brezhnev. The meetings and the leaders who addressed them were as follows: Moldavia, 11 October--Brezhnev; Uzbekistan, 22 October--Suslov; Kirgizia, 2 November--Kosygin; Turkmenia, 15 November--Kirilenko; and Tadzhikistan, 29 November--Podgornyy.

Despite this sharing of protocolary honors, however, Brezhnev's eminence was repeatedly made known in the symbolism of the oratory and the press reports of the ceremonies. The other leaders were cast in varying degrees of subordination, with Suslov getting the best of the secondary honors and Kosygin definitely shortchanged. The most important area--Uzbekistan--was assigned to Suslov, rather than Kosygin or Podgornyy, even though Suslov ranks below them in the Politburo. Further, while a number of prominent leaders attended the Uzbek ceremony addressed by Suslov, few republic leaders and no CPSU Politburo members attended the Kirgiz and Turkmen ceremonies addressed by Kosygin and Kirilenko. The local first secretaries introduced Suslov as an "outstanding figure" of the party, state and

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international communism and Podgornyy as an "outstanding party and state figure." Kosygin and Kirilenko, however, were introduced only as "prominent figures."

HONORS FOR BREZHNEV Each of the five ceremonies were reported as having elected the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev as honorary presidium--a practice which has now become virtually standard. The additional honors lavished on Brezhnev differed somewhat at each ceremony.

In Moldavia several speakers recalled that Brezhnev had led the republic in the early 1950's and credited Moldavia's successes to his leadership and inspiration. The formula Politburo "headed by" (vo glave s) Brezhnev was used by RSFSR Premier M. S. Solomentsev, Ukrainian First Secretary V. V. Shcherbitskiy, Moldavian First Secretary I. I. Bodyul, and Estonian First Secretary I. G. Kebin, while Leningrad First Secretary G. V. Romanov went further, mentioning the Politburo "directed by" (rukovodimoye) Brezhnev. Uzbek First Secretary Sh. R. Rashidov spoke of Brezhnev heading the party, while Bodyul declared that Brezhnev headed the state as well as the party. Azerbaydzhan First Secretary G. A. Aliyev praised Brezhnev as the "experienced leader" (lider) of the party, while Georgian First Secretary E. A. Shevardnadze called him the "leader" of both party and state. Belorussian First Secretary P. M. Masherov praised Brezhnev's "big personal contribution" but referred to him as heading the Central Committee rather than the Politburo. All others simply praised Brezhnev.

At the Uzbek ceremony, First Secretary Rashidov paid indirect honor to Brezhnev by introducing Suslov as "a very close comrade-in-arms" (blizhayshiy soratnik) of Brezhnev. He also described Brezhnev as "heading" the CPSU during the last decade. The formula Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev was used by Leningrad First Secretary Romanov, Ukrainian President I. S. Grushetskiy, Kirgiz First Secretary Usubaliyev, and Armenian Secretary K. S. Demirchyan; the formula Central Committee "headed by" Brezhnev was used by Belorussian First Secretary Masherov and Kazakh President S. B. Niyazbekov, while Moldavian First Secretary Bodyul spoke of the party and Central Committee "headed by" Brezhnev. Georgian First Secretary Shevardnadze, again out in front, called Brezhnev the "worthy and acknowledged leader of our party" and, referring to the improved atmosphere in the party since October 1964, said: "Long live this atmosphere and its creator--the Leninist Central Committee, the wise Politburo headed by" Brezhnev.

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An especially servile atmosphere prevailed at the Kirgiz ceremony. When the officials entered the hall, according to SOVIET KIRGIZIA, the audience responded with the breathtaking shout: "Glory to the Leninist Central Committee of the party, its Politburo headed by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade Leonid Ilich Brezhnev!" The same shout reportedly greeted the election of the Politburo "headed by the tireless fighter for peace and communism" Brezhnev as honorary presidium. First Secretary Usubaliyev introduced Kosygin as "a very close comrade-in-arms" of Brezhnev and declared "glory to the CPSU, its Leninist Central Committee headed by" Brezhnev. The formula of the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev was used by Ukrainian Secretary A. A. Titarenko, Uzbek Premier N. D. Khudayberdiyev, Kazakh Premier B. A. Ashimov, Tadzhik Premier R. N. Nabiyeu, and Armenian Premier G. A. Arzumanyan; Azerbaydzhan Secretary G. N. Seidov spoke of the Central Committee, Government and Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev; while Estonian Premier V. I. Klauson stated: "Long live the CPSU--the party of Lenin and its leading staff--the Politburo headed by" Brezhnev. Lithuanian First Secretary P. P. Grishkyavichus spoke of the Central Committee "headed by" Brezhnev.

At the Turkmen ceremony, First Secretary M. G. Gapurov was, as usual, more restrained, simply using the standard Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev formula and introducing Kirilenko without reference to his closeness to Brezhnev. Unlike Suslov in Uzbekistan and Kosygin in Kirgizia, Brezhnev ally Kirilenko used his speech to laud Brezhnev. The Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev formula was used by Leningrad Secretary Yu. F. Solovyev, Ukrainian First Deputy Premier G. I. Vashchenko, Uzbek President N. M. Matchanov, Kazakh Premier B. A. Ashimov, and Kirgiz First Secretary Usubaliyev; Central Committee "headed by" Brezhnev was used by Moscow Secretary V. N. Yagodka, Moldavian Premier P. A. Paskar, and Latvian First Secretary A. E. Voss; while Azerbaydzhan First Secretary Aliyev again referred to Brezhnev as the "experienced leader" of the party.

At the relatively colorless Tadzhik ceremony, First Secretary D. R. Rasulov failed to call Brezhnev head of the Politburo and introduced Podgornyy without referring to his relationship to Brezhnev. The Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev formula was used by Ukrainian Second Secretary I. K. Lutak, Belorussian President F. A. Surganov, and Lithuanian Second Secretary V. I. Kharazov, while Moldavian President K. F. Ilyashenko and Latvian President P. Ya. Strautmanis called him head of the Central Committee.

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TREATMENT OF OTHERS

Other status indicators, such as the level of representation at each meeting, forms of introduction, and so on, reinforced the image of Brezhnev's eminence and cast the others in varying degrees of subordination. Brezhnev's status was acknowledged, for example, by the fact that almost all the delegations to the ceremony in the small republic of Moldavia, at which he was the honored speaker, were headed by the top leaders of the 16 jurisdictions represented (Moscow and Leningrad plus the 14 union republics). Only Moscow and Kazakhstan were represented by second-ranking officials. Hence, there were one full and four candidate members of the Politburo present--Shcherbitskiy, Solomentsev, Romanov, Masherov, Rashidov.

In Uzbekistan, with Suslov, the leaders of eight of these jurisdictions were present, including two Politburo candidate members, Romanov and Masherov. In Turkmenia, with Kirilenko, there were only four republic first secretaries (Azerbaijan, Latvia, Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan) and no Politburo members. With Kosygin, in Kirgizia, there were only the first secretaries of Lithuania, Moldavia and Turkmenia, and, again, no Politburo members. With Podgornyy, in Tadzhikistan there were the first secretaries of Uzbekistan and Turkmenia, and one Politburo candidate member (Rashidov).

The introductions of the guest speakers also varied. Uzbek First Secretary Rashidov introduced Suslov as an "outstanding figure of the CPSU, Soviet state and international communist movement. . . true and staunch Leninist, a very close comrade-in-arms of Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, a person of great personal charm, . . . warmly respected by all of us." Tadzhik First Secretary Rasulov introduced Podgornyy as an "outstanding party and state figure." Kirgiz First Secretary Usubaliyev introduced Kosygin as a "prominent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet state, a very close comrade-in-arms of Leonid Ilich Brezhnev" and a man with "great organizational abilities, deep knowledge of life, and selfless devotion" to Marxism-Leninism. Turkmen First Secretary Gapurov introduced Kirilenko as a "prominent figure of the Communist party and Soviet state."

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HUNGARY

NEW PARTY CONGRESS GUIDELINES REFLECT ORTHODOX TREND

Budapest's shift from liberal experimentation to a more orthodox style in economic management during the past two years has been formalized in the "Guiding Principles for the 11th MSZMP Congress," released by MTF on 7 December and published by NEPSZABADSAG the next day. The new principles clearly indicate that the leading role of the party and centralized economic planning will be emphasized at the forthcoming congress, scheduled for March 1975, at the expense of the New Economic Management system, which was introduced at the start of 1968 and has come into increasing disfavor in Moscow. On international issues, the guiding principles strongly emphasized the MSZMP's loyalty to the CPSU and the close identification of Hungary with the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. They reiterate Budapest's support for international party conferences and for Moscow's general line on China. The more orthodox tone of the new document is in tune with the closer Moscow-Budapest rapport that was manifested during Kadar's visit to Brezhnev in late September.

The document declared that, while certain "basic" features of the experimental economic management system remain valid, the task of "fundamental importance" at the present time is to strengthen "the central planning organs." It went on to call for new emphasis on the leading role of the communist party and democratic centralism, demanding "an even more consistent assertion," of the MSZMP's leading role, together with an improvement of party members' ideological and political "preparedness" and a "consolidation of party discipline." While expressing continued approval of the practice of involving party rank-and-file in decision-making, it stressed the important of insuring "the unfailing implementation of resolutions and the exercise of control."

The downgrading of the liberal economic management system in the basic document of the upcoming Hungarian party congress in effect climaxes a process which had begun with the November 1972 MSZMP plenum. The plenum called for a "modification of economic regulators" as a means of setting prices and for the reestablishment of "centrally regulated" wages. The readjustment process led subsequently, in March 1974, to the removal of Rezso Nyers--the architect of the liberal economic management system--as MSZMP secretary in charge of the economy and his replacement by a more orthodox figure, Karoly Nemeth. Two days prior to the issuance of the new party congress

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guiding principles, a 5 December MSZMP plenum on the economy at which Nemeth delivered the main report dramatized the urgency of tightening up economic management to deal with various specified shortcomings, including a worsening deficit in Hungary's foreign trade balance.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS The 7 December new guidelines warmly endorsed Moscow's policy of detente with the United States as well as the "coordinated" policy of the USSR and the other socialist countries within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. It declared that the cohesion of these countries under the Pact and CEMA was "the supreme guarantor of our achievements." On inter-party affairs, the document paid effusive tribute to the CPSU:

The CPSU has acquired the greatest amount and the most comprehensive experience in socialist building, in bringing about popular ideological-political unity and in fighting imperialism. It does the most for the development of the international communist movement and for the protection and enrichment of the Leninist heritage of our revolutionary theory.

The party document registered support for a new international conference of communist parties, as well as for the all-European CP conference planned for East Berlin next year. Belgrade has reported that a preparatory meeting for the European CP conference is scheduled to be held in Budapest in the coming weeks. While the differences with the Chinese had not been aired publicly during Kadar's September visit to the USSR, the new party congress guidelines roundly denounced "chauvinist, nationalist and anti-Soviet concepts" as propounded by "the Maoist leadership."

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NOTES

MAKARIOS' RETURN TO CYPRUS: Moscow's initial reaction to President Makarios' 7 December return to Cyprus from exile abroad since the 15 July coup has been confined to short TASS reports. While TASS did describe the return as an "event of major political significance," Soviet reluctance to display more enthusiasm seems to reflect concern that Makarios' presence on the island may exacerbate strains among Greek factions and ultimately prompt Turkish military action, threatening any possibility of a negotiated settlement. Moscow's uncertainty over the political situation was suggested when TASS on the 7th claimed that Makarios' return "signifies the restoration of constitutional order," but backtracked somewhat two days later when it pointed out that "there are still great difficulties and obstacles on the way to reestablishing constitutional law and order." That dispatch referred specifically to the possibility that "hostile forces" might stir up Greek-Turkish animosities on the island. Moscow has also viewed Makarios' return as an opportunity for the Cyprus communist party, AKEL, to participate in the Nicosia government, noting that his return "must lead to the unification of all political forces."

UN VOTE ON KOREA: Pyongyang has hailed as a "great victory" the UN Political Committee's 9 December tie vote on the DPRK-backed resolution calling for withdrawal from South Korea of foreign troops under the UN flag. A NODONG SINMUN editorial article on the 11th, the most authoritative reaction from Pyongyang to date, thanked those who had supported the North and said the vote showed the DPRK's position was strengthening while that of the United States was weakening. The article claimed that a U.S.-backed resolution passed only because of "coercion, money tactics, deception and swindle." Peking's only response to date, a 10 December NCNA report, charged the United States had "railroaded through" its resolution. It quoted Chinese UN representative Huang Hua's pledge after the vote that China would "never barter away principles," and his demand that the UN command be dissolved and U.S. troops withdrawn from the South. The article also noted the North Korean UN delegate's statement that the North "rejects" the decision not to withdraw U.S. troops. Moscow's reaction thus far has been limited to a 10 December TASS report claiming that the United States had "railroaded" through its resolution "designed to continue occupation of the South by American troops."

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JAPANESE LEADERSHIP CHANGE: Both Moscow and Peking have reported the change of Japanese leaders, but neither has offered any direct comment on the new Miki government. Prior to Miki's election as Premier by the Liberal Democratic Party, Moscow had commented that Tanaka's resignation resulted from a "profound crisis" which new leadership would not aid. Since then Moscow has just replayed opposition party and Japanese press comments, as in a 5 December PRAVDA article which called Miki a "prominent political figure" but noted opposition party skepticism over his government's ability to solve Japan's problems. It reported demands by some opposition parties for immediate dissolution of the Diet, but ignored the Japan Communist Party's call that dissolution await a thorough discussion of the issues. A 9 December TASS appraisal of the new government stressed Japan's economic difficulties. Peking noted briefly both Tanaka's resignation and Miki's assumption of power, with NCNA on the 10th quoting Miki's remarks on the importance of friendly Japan-China relations. Underscoring Peking's concern over the continued smooth development of those relations in the face of political turmoil in Tokyo, NCNA reported on 5 December that hospitalized Premier Chou En-lai, in a rare meeting with an unofficial foreign visitor, had a "cordial and friendly talk" with the president of Sokagakkai, a Japanese Buddhist organization closely connected with the opposition Komei party.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 2 - 8 DECEMBER 1974

<u>Moscow (2595 items)</u>			<u>Peking (951 items)</u>		
Brezhnev Visit to	(--)	25%	UNGA Session	(17%)	17%
France			[Korea Debate	(3%)	7%]
[Brezhnev 5 Dec-	(--)	3%]	[Cambodia UN	(6%)	5%]
ember Speech			Representation		
[Communique	(--)	2%]	Criticism of Lin Piao	(8%)	10%
USSR Constitution Day	(--)	6%	and Confucius		
Ford-Brezhnev Talks	(10%)	4%	Cambodia	(4%)	7%
Soyuz 16 Flight	(--)	4%	[Sihanouk in DPRK	(--)	5%]
China	(5%)	4%	Albanian Liberation	(17%)	6%
DRV Economic Delegation in USSR	(--)	2%	30th Anniversary		
			[PRC Delegation	(1%)	4%]
			in Albania		
			11th Romanian CP	(6%)	3%
			Congress		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.